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Eliminating Circuit-Split Disparities in Federal  
Sentencing Under the Post-Booker Guidelines 
ELLIOT EDWARDS* 
Congress has lately been plagued by political polarization and gridlock.1 The 112th 
and 113th Congresses, sitting from 2011 to 2013, have been the least productive in 
modern times.2 By contrast, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which is empowered 
to set the nation’s sentencing policy, has been working diligently despite its 
sometimes politically sensitive task. In 2014, the Commission reduced sentences for 
nonviolent drug offenders and made that reduction retroactive; this change led to the 
release of over six thousand federal inmates in November 2015.3 Such a politically 
dangerous move4 could be unthinkable to the modern Congress. 
The 2014 Term of the U.S. Supreme Court was an important one both for statutory 
interpretation and for federal sentencing law, which are the domains of Congress and 
the Commission, respectively. The Court decided two important cases in June 2015: 
King v. Burwell,5 which upheld a key provision of the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act; and Johnson v. United States,6 which struck down as unconstitution-
ally vague a provision in the Armed Career Criminal Act. The former case, which 
will be discussed in more detail,7 denotes a significant shift in the established prac-
tices of statutory interpretation.8 And the Court’s decision in Johnson has already 
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 1. See SARAH BINDER, BROOKINGS INST., POLARIZED WE GOVERN? (2014), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/05/27-polarized-we-govern-binder 
/brookingscepm_polarized_figreplacedtextrevtablerev.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2HM-37DU]. 
 2. Philip Bump, The 114th Congress Had a Pretty Productive Year (by Recent 
Standards, At Least), WASH. POST: THE FIX (Dec. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/24/the-114th-congress-had-a-pretty-productive-year-by-recent-standards 
-at-least/ [https://perma.cc/7WHY-FLZ9]; see also Drew Desilver, In Late Spurt of Activity, 
Congress Avoids ‘Least Productive’ Title, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: FACT TANK (Dec. 29, 
2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/29/in-late-spurt-of-activity-congress 
-avoids-least-productive-title/ [https://perma.cc/E8Z4-D7ZT] (discussing the 114th Congress). 
 3. Erik Eckholm, Thousands Start Life Anew with Early Prison Releases, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/us/with-early-release-thousands-of-inmates 
-are-adjusting-to-freedom.html [https://perma.cc/5JYW-BH7U]. 
 4. See Sarah Wheaton, Has Obama Set Loose a New Willie Horton?, POLITICO (Nov. 2, 
2015, 5:41 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/obama-prisoner-release-215431 
[https://perma.cc/S6QQ-R2GC]. 
 5. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 6. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. See Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s 
Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62 (2015). 
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prompted the Sentencing Commission, the body that sets federal sentencing policy, 
to revise the Sentencing Guidelines that correspond to the statute the Court 
invalidated.9 
The “career-offender” guideline, which the Commission is currently revising, has 
been a notoriously difficult provision to interpret.10 But the circuits have split over 
provisions in the Guidelines that are much less ambiguous.11 Because the Guidelines 
are supposed to promote uniformity of sentencing throughout the federal courts, the 
disparities caused by these inconsistent interpretations, along with the potential dis-
parities allowed by the appellate courts’ broad authority to interpret the Guidelines, 
are unwarranted and must be addressed. As this Note will show, the political inde-
pendence and procedural fluency of the Commission suggest a simple solution. 
This Note will explore the rarely discussed consequences that result when courts 
of appeals freely interpret the Sentencing Guidelines. This Note will not address ap-
pellate review of sentences in general,12 nor will it discuss disparities caused by trial 
courts.13 Instead, the discussion below will address a very specific situation, namely 
when a court of appeals vacates a sentence because, in its estimation, the trial court 
misapplied the Guidelines. Part I will relate the history of the recent sentencing re-
form movement in America, noting particularly which bodies have the authority to 
decide sentencing policy. Part II will then analyze the interpretive power of the courts 
of appeals—the sole source of their ability to affect sentencing outcomes—and 
demonstrate the potential sentencing disparities that may result. Part III will contrast 
the Sentencing Commission with Congress, demonstrating some key procedural dif-
ferences between the bodies. Finally, Part IV will propose that courts adopt a strictly 
textualist interpretation of the Guidelines, justified by the procedural integrity of the 
Sentencing Commission, that would minimize intercircuit sentencing disparities and 
return discretion to its rightful possessors. 
I. SEATS OF SENTENCING DISCRETION 
The history of sentencing reform in America has been one of shifting discretion.14 
Before the Sentencing Reform Act was passed in 1984, the dominant purpose of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 81 Fed. Reg. 4741 (notice of submis-
sion of amendment given Jan. 27, 2016); Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 80 
Fed. Reg. 49,314 (notice of proposed amendment given Aug. 17, 2015); U.S. Sentencing 
Commission Set To Act on Crimes of Violence, FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS (Jan. 
5, 2016), http://famm.org/u-s-sentencing-commission-set-to-act-on-crimes-of-violence/ [https:// 
perma.cc/3V4D-4NXP].  
 10. See M. Jackson Jones, Ten out of Eleven Federal Circuits Agree: No One Knows 
Whether Section 4B1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Covers Burglary of Com-
mercial Structures, 8 APPALACHIAN J.L. 59, 64–66 (2008). 
 11. See infra Part II.B. 
 12. See, e.g., Note, More Than a Formality: The Case for Meaningful Substantive 
Reasonableness Review, 127 HARV. L. REV. 951 (2014). 
 13. See, e.g., Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First 
Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 14. In this Note, the phrase “sentencing discretion” refers to an entity’s legal authority to 
influence criminal sentences. 
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sentencing was rehabilitation—crime was treated as a disease that could be cured 
through prison time.15 This was the age of “indeterminate” sentencing; trial judges 
had untrammeled authority to impose whatever sentence they saw fit, limited only 
by wide statutory margins.16 Sentencing during this period was not subject to appel-
late review.17 And, because of the parole system, few offenders served their full 
sentences.18 
Offenders had few constitutional protections against judicial sentencing decisions 
during this period.19 In Williams v. New York, a 1949 U.S. Supreme Court case, the 
defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, and the jury recommended life im-
prisonment.20 The judge, considering hearsay evidence of thirty burglaries the de-
fendant had apparently committed as well as his “morbid sexuality,” rejected the 
jury’s recommendation and sentenced Williams to death.21 On appeal, Williams chal-
lenged the sentence on due-process grounds; he had received a death sentence based 
on inadmissible evidence and with no recognizable standard of proof.22 The Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court’s sentence and demonstrated that judges need to use all 
available information about an offender to advance the then-modern goals of crimi-
nal punishment: “[r]eformation and rehabilitation of offenders.”23 Because out-of-
court information is “[h]ighly relevant” to proper sentencing, the Court reasoned, the 
Due Process Clause should not be allowed to interfere with penological advances.24 
By the 1970s, the indeterminate model had fallen under harsh attack from all 
sides.25 Scholars and politicians began to argue that criminal “treatment” methods 
were ineffective at preventing recidivism or reforming inmates,26 and the unlimited 
discretion enjoyed by trial judges seemed to invite totally arbitrary sentences27 
motivated in some cases by racial bias.28 These problems sparked an era of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much 
Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 695 (2010). Much of this discussion 
of sentencing history is drawn from Judge Gertner’s article. 
 16. Id. at 696. 
 17. Id. at 695–96; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (“Before the 
Guidelines system, a federal criminal sentence was, for all practical purposes, not reviewable 
on appeal.”). 
 18. Gertner, supra note 15, at 696. An average federal inmate was paroled after serving 
only fifty-eight percent of her sentence. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF 
GUIDELINES SENTENCING 45 (2004). 
 19. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251–52 (1949). 
 20. Id. at 242. 
 21. Id. at 244. 
 22. Id. at 245–46. 
 23. Id. at 248. 
 24. Id. at 247, 251. 
 25. See Gertner, supra note 15, at 698. 
 26. See id. For an influential review of studies about criminal rehabilitation, see Robert 
Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, PUB. INT., Spring 
1974, at 22. 
 27. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 49 
(1973) (criticizing judges’ “unbridled power . . . to be arbitrary and discriminatory”). 
 28. See Joseph C. Howard, Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 59 JUDICATURE 121 (1975) 
(providing a contemporary account of the racial problems that prompted sentencing reform). 
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comprehensive sentencing reform that continues to this day.29 The two subparts that 
follow will discuss the two landmark events in recent legal history that shifted the 
seat of federal sentencing discretion: Part I.A will describe the creation of the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, and Part I.B will discuss a series of Supreme Court 
decisions that returned some discretion to trial judges. 
A. The Sentencing Commission 
After nearly a decade of trying,30 Congress passed a comprehensive sentencing 
reform bill on October 12, 1984.31 The Sentencing Reform Act of 198432 made sev-
eral key reforms. First, retribution replaced rehabilitation as the primary purpose of 
sentencing.33 Thus, the Act abolished federal parole boards that had previously re-
leased “reformed” inmates.34 This change also meant that an offender would know 
at sentencing exactly how long her sentence would be.35 The second and more con-
troversial effect of the Act was to establish the U.S. Sentencing Commission and to 
direct the Commission to write the Sentencing Guidelines.36 This Commission was 
to comprise several sentencing experts37 who would be able to create fair sentencing 
standards without yielding to political pressures.38 
After three years of heated debate, the Commission published the first U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual on November 1, 1987.39 This sparked a period of con-
stitutional attacks on the Guidelines and utter confusion over how they should be 
implemented.40 The Supreme Court declared the Guidelines constitutional in 
Mistretta v. United States, which quieted the litigation.41 Once the constitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. A bipartisan sentencing reform bill was introduced in the Senate on October 1, 2015. 
Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong. (as introduced in 
Senate, Oct. 1, 2015); Senators Announce Bipartisan Sentencing Reform and Corrections 
Act, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (Oct. 1, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www 
.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/senators-announce-bipartisan-sentencing-reform-and-corrections 
-act [https://perma.cc/R2SB-T683]. 
 30. For a detailed account of the legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act and the 
creation of the Guidelines, see Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: 
The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993). 
 31. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 18, at 5. 
 32. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 33. Gertner, supra note 15, at 698. 
 34. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 18, at 11–12. 
 35. This concept is often called “truth in sentencing.” Id. 
 36. Gertner, supra note 15, at 698–99. 
 37. Id. at 700. 
 38. See id. at 698. 
 39. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 40. Carol P. Getty, Twenty Years of Federal Criminal Sentencing, 7 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L 
STUD. 117, 119 (2007). 
 41. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). Mistretta was an important case that generated quite a few case 
notes by law students; for a sample, see Julia L. Black, Note, The Constitutionality of Federal 
Sentences Imposed Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 After Mistretta v. United States, 
75 IOWA L. REV. 767 (1990); Arthur C. Leahy, Note, Mistretta v. United States: Mistreating 
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challenges were resolved, the Guidelines went into mandatory effect throughout the 
U.S. federal district courts.42 
The Guidelines are essentially a mathematical formula that courts were required 
to use to calculate sentences. 43 Today, sentencing is a three-step process: First, the 
judge looks up the “base offense level” for the offender’s crime of conviction.44 Then 
she considers the offender’s “actual conduct”—what the offender really did—and 
adds enhancements and reductions to the offense level accordingly.45 She takes the 
final offense level along with a separately calculated “criminal history category” and, 
finally, finds the offender’s sentencing range on the Guidelines Manual’s chart.46 
Under the original structure of the Guidelines, judges had the authority to “depart” 
from the calculated Guidelines range47 if a particular offender presented extraordi-
nary mitigating or aggravating factors at sentencing.48 The Sentencing Commission 
describes these “atypical” cases that warrant departure as outside the “heartland” of 
circumstances the Guidelines are supposed to cover.49 The facts of Koon v. United 
States, in which the Court set abuse of discretion as the standard of appellate review 
for departures,50 provide a good example of such a departure. Stacey Koon and 
Laurence Powell, two Los Angeles police officers, were convicted in federal court 
of violating Rodney King’s constitutional rights, and the judge sentenced each de-
fendant to thirty months in prison.51 This was a significant downward departure from 
the properly calculated Guidelines range, which was seventy to eighty-seven 
months.52 The trial judge justified this departure based on such factors as the victim’s 
conduct and the likelihood that Koon and Powell would be abused in prison.53  
                                                                                                                 
 
the Separation of Powers Doctrine?, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 209 (1990); Laura Leigh Taylor 
& J. Richard Neville, Note, Mistretta v. United States: Upholding the Constitutionality of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, 40 MERCER L. REV. 1429 (1989). 
 42. Taylor & Neville, supra note 41, at 1430. 
 43. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2015) (instructions for calculating the Guidelines). 
 44. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(2). 
 45. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(3)–(5). The “real offense” standard was intended in part to reduce the 
sentencing discretion of prosecutors, who could otherwise control an offender’s sentence by 
deciding to charge one crime but not another. Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Revisited, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 180, 182 (1999). But see Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, Guide-
lines as Guidelines: Lessons from the History of Sentencing Reform, 2 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 
101, 127 n.159 (2010) (“[T]he pre-Booker guidelines may have increased prosecutorial dis-
cretion by permitting prosecutors to charge and prove a minor offense and then punish the 
defendant for conduct not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 46. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(6), (7) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2015). 
 47. Gertner, supra note 15, at 699. 
 48. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92–93 (1996). 
 49. Id. at 94. 
 50. Id. at 91. 
 51. Id. at 88–90; Seth Mydans, Sympathetic Judges Gives Officers 2 1/2 Years in Rodney 
King Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993, at A1. 
 52. Koon, 518 U.S. at 89. 
 53. Id. 
822 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:817 
 
In 2003, Congress limited even this amount of discretion. The PROTECT Act 
abrogated the Court’s decision in Koon by allowing courts of appeals to review de-
partures de novo.54 In 2005, when the Supreme Court ruled the Guidelines advisory, 
it in turn struck down that provision of the PROTECT Act, a provision that would 
only work if the Guidelines were mandatory.55 
From their creation in 1987 until 2005, the Guidelines were mandatory, and sen-
tencing discretion was concentrated in the Sentencing Commission. Congress man-
aged its goal of reducing the extreme freedom possessed by judges in the indetermi-
nate-sentencing era. But judges and scholars criticized the Guidelines system for 
being too harsh and too restrictive of the trial judges who are the most closely in-
volved with real-life sentencing.56 As the new millennium began, the Supreme Court 
reclaimed some discretion for the trial judge. 
B. The Effects of Booker 
The end of the age of mandatory Guidelines began in 2000, when the Supreme 
Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey.57 The Court held that, under the Sixth 
Amendment, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to 
a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”58 As the Court made clear four years 
later in Blakely v. Washington, this statutory maximum is the maximum penalty the 
judge could impose without finding additional facts not included in the jury’s ver-
dict.59 In Blakely, the defendant was sentenced under the state of Washington’s de-
terminate sentencing scheme, and the standard range for his crime of conviction, 
kidnapping with a firearm, was forty-nine to fifty-three months.60 The trial judge, 
however, found that Blakely had acted with “deliberate cruelty” and sentenced him 
to ninety months in prison—a thirty-seven-month upward departure—based on evi-
dence not proved to the jury.61 The Court held that this violated Apprendi: because 
the judge could not have imposed a sentence longer than fifty-three months without 
additional facts, those facts had to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.62 
Blakely set the stage for the demise of the mandatory Guidelines.63 Seven months 
later, the Supreme Court found that the Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today 
Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d)(2), 117 Stat. 650, 670, invalidated 
by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 55. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259; see infra text accompanying note 73. 
 56. See Getty, supra note 40, at 119. 
 57. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 58. Id. at 490. 
 59. 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004). 
 60. Id. at 299. 
 61. Id. at 300. 
 62. Id. at 303–05. 
 63. See Rose Duffy, Comment, The Return of Judicial Discretion, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 223, 
231 (2008); see also Blakely, 542 U.S. at 326 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Over 20 years of 
sentencing reform are all but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal judgments are in 
jeopardy.”). 
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if mandatory in United States v. Booker.64 Freddie Booker was convicted of pos-
sessing with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of crack cocaine; the prosecutor 
had shown the jury evidence that Booker had possessed 92.5 grams.65 Under the 
Guidelines, the maximum period of incarceration Booker could have been sentenced 
to for that quantity was 262 months—twenty-one years, ten months.66 At sentencing, 
however, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker had actu-
ally possessed an additional 566 grams and that he was guilty of obstructing justice; 
in light of these findings, the judge calculated Booker’s Guidelines range at thirty 
years to life in prison.67 Booker challenged his sentence under Blakely, and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
In an unusual move, the Court delivered two majority opinions; only Justice 
Ginsburg joined them both.68 The first, written by Justice Stevens, found that the 
Apprendi-Blakely rule applies to the Guidelines: Booker’s sentence did violate his 
Sixth Amendment rights.69 Justice Breyer wrote the second opinion, which found 
that the best remedy for the Guidelines’ constitutional problem was to sever and ex-
cise the statutory provision that made them binding on federal courts.70 Booker made 
the Guidelines merely “advisory,”71 so courts had to “take account of” the offender’s 
correct Guidelines range, but they were not bound to follow it.72 The Court also 
struck down a statute that directed courts of appeals to review departures from the 
Guidelines de novo.73 After Booker, sentences are reviewed only for their 
“reasonableness.”74  
Thus, since Booker, a sentencing judge has broad sentencing power—as long as 
she lays out a reasonable basis for imposing a particular sentence, she is bound only 
by the statutory sentencing limits for the offense of conviction.75 Not only may she 
depart from the Guidelines as she could when they were mandatory, but she may also 
“vary” from them by declaring that the calculated range does not serve the purposes 
of punishment.76 The law concerning departures and variances is fairly complex and 
beyond the scope of this paper, but two points are especially relevant. 
First, a court of appeals can vacate a sentence if it finds that the district court 
miscalculated the Guidelines range, which is considered “significant procedural er-
ror.”77 A sentence is usually considered procedurally unreasonable if the Guidelines 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 65. Id. at 227. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 226 (Stevens, J., majority opinion); id. at 244 (Breyer, J., majority opinion). 
 69. Id. at 243–44 (Stevens, J., majority opinion). 
 70. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., majority opinion). 
 71. Id. at 266. 
 72. Id. at 259. 
 73. Id. at 260–61. 
 74. Id. at 261. 
 75. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 107 (2007) (noting that Booker brought 
“advisory Guidelines combined with appellate review for reasonableness”). 
 76. “‘Departure’ . . . refers only to non-Guidelines sentences imposed under the frame-
work set out in the Guidelines.” Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714 (2008). All other 
non-Guidelines sentences are called “variances.” Id. at 715.  
 77. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
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were miscalculated, even if the sentence actually imposed fell within the proper 
Guidelines range.78 This is due to a concern about the “anchoring effect,” a cognitive 
bias that causes people to be unduly influenced by the first number they encounter;79 
in the case of sentencing, this “anchor” is the Guidelines range.80 Part II will demon-
strate that the power of the courts of appeals to decide what a guideline means and 
to vacate sentences that do not comply with that meaning is not trivial. 
Second, since Booker, the Supreme Court has held that a district judge’s variance 
based solely on her disagreement with the policy judgments of the Sentencing Guide-
lines is not necessarily unreasonable.81 In Kimbrough v. United States, the district 
judge disagreed with the Guidelines’ 100-to-1 ratio between sentences for possessing 
crack and powder cocaine (the “crack/powder disparity”).82 The Court upheld the 
district judge’s decision, stating that Booker had made the whole Guidelines Manual 
advisory.83 A district court must use the Guidelines as “the starting point and the 
initial benchmark” of its sentence,84 but it need not ultimately follow them.85 
These developments indicate that there is a tense balance between two seats of 
sentencing discretion: the Sentencing Commission, whose Guidelines still carry pro-
cedural weight despite being advisory and whom Congress continues to direct to re-
search and promulgate sentencing policy, and the federal district courts, who can 
freely vary from the Guidelines’ instructions when sentencing. No other entities have 
the explicit authority to directly influence sentencing policy in the federal system.  
II. INTERPRETIVE DISCRETION 
Though the Sentencing Commission and trial judges exercise the only expressly 
delegated sentencing authority in the federal system, the federal courts of appeals 
can also influence sentences within their own circuits by interpreting specific provi-
sions in the Guidelines. This appellate power serves a vital and legitimate purpose, 
even under the advisory Guidelines: a circuit court’s interpretation of a guideline will 
ensure that all the district courts in the circuit apply that guideline consistently.86 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. See United States v. Robinson, 714 F.3d 466, 467–68 (7th Cir. 2013) (“If . . . the two-
level increase for distribution was error, [defendant] is entitled to be resentenced, because the 
increase in the guideline range may have influenced the sentence that the judge gave him.”). 
 79. Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot” 
Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 495 (2014); see also Jelani Jefferson Exum, The More Things 
Change: A Psychological Case Against Allowing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines To Stay 
the Same in Light of Gall, Kimbrough, and New Understandings of Reasonableness Review, 
58 CATH. U. L. REV. 115, 125–26 (2008). 
 80. Exum, supra note 79, at 125. 
 81. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108–10 (2007). 
 82. See id. at 91. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (decided the same day as Kimbrough). 
 85. Kimbrough, 552 U.S at 91. 
 86. See United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969, 979 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 
(Pregerson, J., dissenting) (“[I]ntracircuit sentencing disparities . . . defeat the fundamental 
purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines: ‘reasonable uniformity in sentencing’ among federal 
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When a guideline’s text is especially unclear, the need for consistency within a circuit 
is apparent.87 Even if the circuits interpret ambiguous text differently, the 
Commission can resolve the ambiguity without worrying about a free-for-all among 
the federal district courts. 
The Commission is in an unusually strong position to resolve such circuit con-
flicts.88 While the U.S. Supreme Court is traditionally responsible for resolving cir-
cuit splits over the meaning of a statute,89 it has recognized the Sentencing Commis-
sion’s unique authority and responsibility to “review and revise” the Guidelines.90 In 
Braxton v. United States, the Court chose not to resolve a circuit conflict because 
Congress had entrusted the Commission with the duty to “make whatever clarifying 
revisions to the Guidelines conflicting judicial decisions might suggest.”91 Justice 
Scalia, writing for a unanimous bench, suggested that the Court should be “restrained 
and circumspect in using [its] certiorari power” to resolve circuit conflicts dealing 
with Guidelines issues.92 
The Court has kept its promise. Though it has granted certiorari in several cases 
involving the Guidelines,93 it has never answered an unsettled question about Guide-
lines interpretation.94 Thus, the Commission is entirely responsible for fixing prob-
lems with how courts interpret the Guidelines; this is due in part to the Commission’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
districts.” (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3, 
policy statement (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015))). 
 87. One guideline that has defied consistent interpretation is section 4B1.2, which defines 
the term “crime of violence” as it is used in the Guidelines’ career offender provision. Jones, 
supra note 10, at 65–66. According to the section, crimes of violence include offenses that 
“involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). The cir-
cuits are split, for example, on whether driving while intoxicated (DWI) is a crime of violence. 
Compare United States v. Templeton, 543 F.3d 378 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that DWI is not a 
crime of violence), with United States v. Spudich, 510 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that 
DWI is a crime of violence). The Supreme Court recently struck down an identical residual 
clause in the Armed Career Criminals Act as unconstitutionally vague, Johnson v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012)), and the 
Sentencing Commission is in the process of amending section 4B1.2 to delete the clause en-
tirely, Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 80 Fed. Reg. 49,314 (proposed Aug. 
17, 2015). 
 88. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991). 
 89. Id. at 347–48 (“A principal purpose for which we use our certiorari jurisdiction . . . is 
to resolve conflicts among the United States courts of appeals and state courts concerning the 
meaning of provisions of federal law.”). 
 90. Id. at 348 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2012)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. These cases often involve the Constitution. See, e.g., Peugh v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 2072 (2013) (Ex Post Facto clause); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Sixth 
Amendment jury-trial right); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (separation of 
powers). 
 94. The Court has on one occasion granted certiorari in a Guidelines case and ruled that 
a circuit court’s application of a guideline was incorrect. Salinas v. United States, 547 U.S. 
188 (2006) (per curiam), vacating 142 F. App’x 830 (5th Cir. 2005). But the Salinas opinion, 
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“unusual explicit power to decide whether and to what extent its amendments reduc-
ing sentences will be given retroactive effect.”95 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s reticence and the Commission’s deliberate 
procedures, the courts of appeals wield substantial power over how the Guidelines 
are applied in their circuits. Even when the text of a guideline is not ambiguous, 
appellate courts can use their interpretive power to influence sentencing policy.96 
When courts interpret the Guidelines, they often state axiomatically that they apply 
the rules of statutory interpretation,97 so this power can be quite broad depending on 
a judge’s preferred theory of interpretation. Part II.A will discuss major themes in 
modern statutory interpretation; Part II.B will examine three instances where courts 
of appeals seem to have exercised undue discretion in interpreting the Guidelines; 
and Part II.C will explain why the outcomes of those cases are undesirable in the 
current sentencing scheme. 
A. Traditional Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
A divide has long existed between judges who believe a statutory text has an ob-
jective meaning that must control its interpretation, broadly called “textualists,” and 
those who believe that either the legislature’s intent or the statute’s purpose can con-
trol, broadly called “purposivists.”98 This schism has led to debates among scholars 
and judges about how judges ought to interpret statutes.99 
Modern textualists believe that the only legitimate source of the meaning of a 
statute is its text.100 This is true even when the text might appear to defeat the sup-
posed purpose of the statute.101 A major reason textualists choose to reject other evi-
dence of statutory purpose is that the legislative process is easily subverted by party 
                                                                                                                 
 
only two paragraphs long, notes that even the “Solicitor General acknowledge[d] that the Fifth 
Circuit incorrectly ruled for the United States.” Id. at 188. 
 95. Braxton, 500 U.S. at 348 (emphasis omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(u) (2012)). 
 96. See United States v. Hunn, 24 F.3d 994, 1000 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J., dis-
senting) (arguing strenuously that the majority’s interpretation of the guideline at issue con-
tradicted the provision’s text). 
 97. See, e.g., United States v. Hackman, 630 F.3d 1078, 1083 (8th Cir. 2011) (“We em-
ploy basic rules of statutory construction when interpreting the Guidelines . . . .”); United 
States v. Cross, 371 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Interpreting a guideline is no different 
than interpreting a statute; the standard rules of statutory construction apply.”); United States 
v. Robinson, 94 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1996) (“This Court applies the rules of statutory 
construction when interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines.”); United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 
219, 243 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The Sentencing Guidelines are subject to the rules of statutory 
construction.”). 
 98. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 324 (1990). Eskridge and Frickey distinguish “purposivism” 
from “intentionalism,” but the distinction is subtle and unnecessary in this discussion. Id. 
 99. Id. at 321. 
 100. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
70, 73 (2006). 
 101. Id.; see also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2502 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Statutory design and purpose matter only to the extent they help clarify an otherwise ambig-
uous provision.”). 
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leadership and special-interest groups.102 Furthermore, Professor (now Judge) 
Easterbrook points out that nearly every statute is the result of bargaining and com-
promise among legislators;103 if a statutory outcome seems strange, it is likely a result 
of such a bargain. 
Justice Scalia used this approach in his dissent in King v. Burwell.104 That case 
involved the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s tax subsidies for certain 
citizens.105 The statute provided a credit to certain taxpayers, provided they pur-
chased health insurance from “an Exchange established by the State.”106 The Court 
held that in order for the statutory scheme to work, this phrase must also include 
Exchanges established by the federal government.107 Scalia was incredulous—how 
could “established by the State” mean “established by the State or the federal 
government”?108 
Justice Scalia argued that the plain language must trump any judicial divination 
of purpose.109 He further questioned the majority’s conviction that the textualist read-
ing of the statute did not advance a reasonable motive.110 In other words, just because 
the law did not operate the way the majority thought it should does not justify de-
parting from the plain meaning of the text.111 
The main theory opposing textualism, known as purposivism, was long charac-
terized by a single Supreme Court decision, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United 
States,112 and its famous rule that “a thing may be within the letter of the statute and 
yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit.”113 This was the dominant 
approach to statutory interpretation for nearly a century after Holy Trinity was 
decided.114 
Purposivism is the interpretive theory adopted by The Legal Process, one of the 
most influential legal texts of the twentieth century.115 Writing in 1958, Hart and 
Sacks lay out a two-step method for interpreting statutes: a court should first 
“[d]ecide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute” and then “[i]nterpret the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540–41, 547–48 (1983). 
 103. Id. at 540. 
 104. 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. at 2485 (majority opinion). 
 106. Id. at 2487 (emphasis in original) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)–(c) (2012)). 
 107. Id. at 2496. 
 108. Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 2502. 
 110. Id. at 2504. 
 111. Professor Gluck notes that the petitioners also argued that the textualist reading was 
consistent with the purpose of the statute—a good example of a strange-looking bargain. 
Gluck, supra note 8, at 72–73. 
 112. 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
 113. Id. at 459 (emphasis added). 
 114. John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 113. For the per-
spective of a Justice from a past generation, see Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the 
Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538–39 (1947). 
 115. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Intro-
duction to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS at li, li (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (tent. ed. 1958). 
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words of the statute . . . so as to carry out the purpose as best it can.”116 In other 
words, a judge should decide on the purpose of the statute first and make the text fit 
that meaning second, as long as she does not give the words “a meaning they will not 
bear.”117 To find this purpose, the court should not, as Hart and Sacks put it, “tak[e] 
account of all the short-run currents of political expedience that swirl around any 
legislative session”;118 instead, “[i]t should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably 
appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable 
purposes reasonably.”119 
Hints of this purpose-first approach can be found in Chief Justice Roberts’ major-
ity opinion in King.120 The structure of the opinion is unusual: rather than discussing 
the text at the beginning, determining that it was ambiguous, and then proceeding to 
the purpose, which is the usual logical order of interpretation, Roberts began with a 
lengthy exposition of the Affordable Care Act’s healthcare scheme.121 He would use 
this “plan” to justify his interpretation of the phrase “established by the state” later 
in the opinion.122 Thus the Court seemed to perform a version of the Legal Process 
two-step, starting with the statute’s purpose before making the text fit. 
A more modern rationale for advancing the legislative purpose is that it would be 
a waste of Congress’s time to make it go back and fix its legislation’s text when 
purpose is clear from other sources, such as legislative history.123 This argument is 
based on the reality of congressional gridlock: Congress rarely acts to fix statutes 
after adverse rulings.124 This principle of “legislative inertia” has even led Professor 
(now Judge) Guido Calabresi to propose that courts should be able to invalidate stat-
utes when they have become outmoded just as courts can change common-law 
rules.125 
Since the resurgence of textualism on the Court starting in the 1990s, however, 
Holy Trinity purposivism has fallen into disfavor.126 Professor Gluck argues that 
King demonstrates a potential successor to purposivism for today’s modern, complex 
Congress.127 She posits that Congress does not draft statutes perfectly—how could 
it?—but that its legislation does have a “plan.”128 This approach is based on 
Congress’s institutional inability to meticulously draft the kinds of very long and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. HART & SACKS, supra note 115, at 1374 (emphasis added). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1378. 
 119. Id. (emphasis added). 
 120. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 121. Id. at 2485–87. 
 122. Id. at 2493. 
 123. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (“[W]e do the country a disservice when we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of 
Congress’ actual purpose and require it ‘to take the time to revisit the matter’ and to restate its 
purpose in more precise English whenever its work product suffers from an omission or in-
advertent error.” (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1031 (1984) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting))). 
 124. See Gluck, supra note 8, at 107–08. 
 125. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 113–14 (1982). 
 126. Manning, supra note 114, at 125, 131. 
 127. Gluck, supra note 8, at 87. 
 128. Id. 
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complex bills that today’s Congress is passing.129 The Court’s role in this context is 
“only to not ‘negate’ the plan.”130 
Judge Posner, responding to Professor Gluck, suggests that judges do not interpret 
statutes based on legal scholarship.131 Posner instead says that judges are consciously 
or unconsciously influenced by “politics and consequences.”132 As a result, judges 
often consider background principles, such as political outcomes, common-law pre-
sumptions, and substantive policy values, when they look at statutes.133 These prin-
ciples derive not from the text but from the background legal landscape (e.g., the 
common law) that Congress is presumed to know.134 
Judges often bring background principles from the common law and other sources 
to bear when interpreting statutes. These include the substantive political values 
Judge Posner describes,135 as well as the so-called “canons of interpretation” that 
Karl Llewellyn long ago derided for being contradictory.136 Canons fall into two 
main categories: linguistic and substantive.137 Linguistic canons deal with the stat-
ute’s text; these include expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the rule that the inclu-
sion of certain items in a list excludes those not listed.138 Substantive canons, on the 
other hand, deal with a statute’s policy effects.139 For example, some disfavored ef-
fects may be brought about only through a “clear statement” by the legislature.140 
Judges have used these three sources of information—the statute’s text, its pur-
pose, and background principles—to interpret statutes for hundreds of years.141 The 
rules of statutory interpretation have seeped into the common law, guiding courts and 
forming schools of thought about how interpretation ought to be done. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. Id. at 87–88. 
 130. Id. at 88. 
 131. Richard A. Posner, Response, Comment on Professor Gluck’s “Imperfect Statutes, 
Imperfect Courts,” 129 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 11, 11, 13 (2015). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 338–428 (5th ed. 
2009) (discussing “background considerations”). 
 134. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(stating that, “by a benign fiction, [the Court] assume[s] Congress always has in mind” the 
statute’s common-law background). 
 135. Posner, supra note 131, at 11–12. 
 136. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950); see 
also Michael Sinclair, “Only a Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling Canons,” One 
to Seven, 50 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 919, 921 (2005–2006). 
 137. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 921, 927 (1992). 
 138. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 805 & n.25 (1983). 
 139. Shapiro, supra note 137, at 934. 
 140. Id. at 940 (“Adopted by courts in pursuit of some explicitly stated policy objective, 
clear statement rules embody the view that the legislature can achieve a particular result only 
by explicit statement . . . .” (emphasis in original)). 
 141. See POPKIN, supra note 133, at 9–10. 
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B. Disparities Against the Text: Three Examples 
When they interpret the Guidelines, courts do not always declare the text ambigu-
ous before announcing an interpretation that seems to contradict that text. This 
Section will describe three examples of circuit conflicts in which some courts of ap-
peals applied background principles while others stuck to the text. 
1. “Express Threat of Death” 
Section 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) of the 1993 Guidelines Manual provided that an offender 
convicted of bank robbery received a two-level enhancement “if an express threat of 
death was made.” The commentary to that section contained an extensive definition 
of the phrase: 
An “express threat of death[]” . . . may be in the form of an oral or writ-
ten statement, act, gesture, or combination thereof. For example, an oral 
or written demand using words such as “Give me the money or I will kill 
you”, “Give me the money or I will pull the pin on the grenade I have in 
my pocket”, “Give me the money or I will shoot you”, “Give me your 
money or else (where the defendant draws his hand across his throat in a 
slashing motion)”, or “Give me the money or you are dead” would con-
stitute an express threat of death. The court should consider that the intent 
of the underlying provision is to provide an increased offense level for 
cases in which the offender(s) engaged in conduct that would instill in a 
reasonable person, who is a victim of the offense, significantly greater 
fear than that necessary to constitute an element of the offense of 
robbery.142 
This language caused a heated circuit split.143 The majority of circuits followed 
the Commission’s broad rule as stated in the commentary.144 The Eleventh Circuit, 
by contrast, looked only at the text of the guideline, not the commentary, and held 
that “[t]he statement, ‘I have a gun’ . . . . may imply a threat to use the gun, but that 
does not constitute an express death threat.”145 
The Seventh Circuit’s case on this issue is representative.146 In United States v. 
Hunn, the defendant, Andrew Hunn, committed five bank robberies, and he repeat-
edly kept his hand inside his coat, leading the banks’ tellers to believe he had a gun.147 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1 cmt. n.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
1993) (amended 1997).  
 143. United States v. Alexander, 88 F.3d 427, 428–29 (6th Cir. 1996) (describing the cir-
cuit conflict).  
 144. See, e.g., United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
France, 57 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hunn, 24 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Lambert, 995 F.2d 1006 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 
1374 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 145. United States v. Canzater, 994 F.2d 773, 775 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). 
 146. Hunn, 24 F.3d 994. 
 147. Id. at 995. 
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In particular, Hunn robbed the final bank by 
hand[ing] a different teller a note stating, “Give me all the money now. I 
have a gun. No tricks, I’m watching.” When this teller replied that Hunn 
must be joking, he insisted, “No, I mean it,” and “Hurry up.” The teller 
stated that Hunn was pointing something from inside his right coat 
pocket toward her during the robbery as if he had a hidden gun.148 
The district court concluded that this behavior constituted an express death threat and 
assessed the two-level enhancement.149 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed.150 It rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s approach and 
called it an “unnecessarily cramped” reading of the guideline.151 The court also in-
accurately characterized the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation as requiring speech as 
opposed to “sign-language or miming.”152 The court then analogized the commen-
tary’s definition to the crime of aggravated assault, which requires “communication 
of a threat that creates a reasonable apprehension of death or serious bodily harm.”153 
Hunn’s conduct was similar to a 1963 Illinois case in which the defendant committed 
assault with intent to murder by showing the outline of a gun through her coat 
pocket;154 this similarity was enough for the Seventh Circuit to conclude that Hunn 
had made an “express threat of death.”155 
Judge Easterbrook, a staunch textualist,156 dissented.157 He reasoned that the 
Sentencing Commission distinguished between two different types of death threats 
—express and implied—and opted to create an enhancement only for express threats. 
“A literal reading of the guideline . . . is not ‘cramped’ but is the only way to ensure 
that the text serves its function.”158 He claimed that that, through its interpretation, 
the majority had read “express” out of the Guideline.159  
With United States v. Alexander, the Sixth Circuit became the first to agree with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 996. 
 150. Id. at 995. 
 151. Id. at 997. 
 152. Id. The Eleventh Circuit merely held that indicating that one has a gun “may imply a 
threat to use the gun, but that does not constitute an express death threat.” United States v. 
Canzater, 994 F.2d 773, 775 (11th Cir. 1993). One can certainly express a death threat in 
pantomime, but, as Judge Easterbrook argues in his dissent in Hunn, it is logically incoherent 
to make an express threat by implication. Hunn, 24 F.3d at 1000 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
 153. Hunn, 24 F.3d at 997 (majority opinion).  
 154. People v. Preis, 189 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. 1963). The Supreme Court of Illinois held that 
“[a]n assault may consist of using a gesture toward another so as to give him reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person using the gesture means to apply actual force to his person.” 
Id. at 256. 
 155. Hunn, 24 F.3d at 997. 
 156. For Judge Easterbrook’s own views on statutory interpretation, see Easterbrook, 
supra note 102. 
 157. Hunn, 24 F.3d. at 999 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 1000. 
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the Eleventh Circuit’s and Judge Easterbrook’s reasoning.160 In that case, the district 
judge ruled that “saying that I’ve got a bomb in my case and a gun certainly implies 
a threat of death to this Court.”161 The Sixth Circuit reversed162 but went further than 
either of the earlier opinions. The court ruled that the commentary was actually in-
consistent with the text of the guideline and thus was not binding.163 In his opinion 
for the court, Judge Suhrheinrich characterized decisions such as the Seventh 
Circuit’s as dealing with “direct implication[s] of death,” but not express death 
threats.164 In order to satisfy section 2B3.1(b)(2)(F), the court held, “a defendant’s 
statement must distinctly and directly indicate that the defendant intends to kill or 
otherwise cause the death of the victim.”165 Otherwise, the word “express” loses all 
meaning, and the enhancement applies even when an offender makes an implied 
threat.166 As four of the five examples given in the commentary do not “distinctly 
and directly” state a death threat, the court found that they are not authoritative 
—instead, the guideline’s text controls.167 
In 1997, facing this disagreement among the circuits, the Sentencing Commission 
amended section 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) and its commentary.168 Amendment 552 deleted the 
word “express” from the guideline and amended the commentary to provide that “the 
defendant does not have to state expressly his intent to kill the victim in order for the 
enhancement to apply.”169 
2. “Distribution” of Child Pornography 
The circuits have more recently disagreed over an enhancement in the guideline 
concerning possession of child pornography. This enhancement, section 
2G2.2(b)(3)(F), increases the offense level by two “[i]f the offense involved . . . 
[d]istribution other than distribution described in” other enhancements in the 
guideline.170 The commentary defines distribution as 
any act, including possession with intent to distribute, production, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. 88 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 1996). The court quotes extensively from Judge Easterbrook’s 
dissent in Hunn. Id. at 430–31. 
 161. Id. at 428 (emphasis added). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 431. “[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a 
guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is in-
consistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Stinson v. United States, 
508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993). 
 164. Alexander, 88 F.3d at 428–29. 
 165. Id. at 431 (citing United States v. Cadotte, 57 F.3d 661, 662 (1995) (Arnold, J., 
dissenting)). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. (citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993)). 
 168. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 552 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Other distribution enhancements include “[d]istribution for pecuniary gain” and 
“[d]istribution to a minor.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(3)(A), (C) 
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).  
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transmission, advertisement, and transportation, related to the transfer of 
material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. Accordingly, 
distribution includes posting material involving the sexual exploitation 
of a minor on a website for public viewing but does not include the mere 
solicitation of such material by a defendant.171 
The distribution enhancement became effective in November 2000,172 and the 
definition of “distribution” in substantially its current form was added in 2004.173 
Since then, the technology used in child pornography offenses has changed; today’s 
offenders often use so-called peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing programs.174 Some of 
these programs automatically upload the files that the user downloads, so that a user 
with limited technological understanding might unknowingly “distribute” files.175 
Some courts were hesitant to apply the guideline to offenders who did not know they 
were distributing because “strict liability is disfavored in the criminal context.”176 
The circuits have interpreted the enhancement in three different ways: (1) the en-
hancement applies to any offender who distributes, knowingly or not,177 (2) the 
enhancement applies unless the defendant can show “concrete evidence of igno-
rance,”178 or (3) the enhancement applies only if the prosecution can prove 
knowledge.179 
The Fifth,180 Tenth,181 and Eleventh182 Circuits have each held that the text of the 
guideline and its commentary unambiguously do not contain a knowledge require-
ment. These cases rely on two key facts about the text. First, the guideline’s language 
does not expressly mention any mens rea requirement.183 The Eleventh Circuit, for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 171. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 172. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 
35 (2009). 
 173. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 664 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015). In 2009, the Commission added a single word (transmission) to the language 
of the definition. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 733 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 174. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES 
48–53 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and 
-reports/sex-offense-topics/201212-federal-child-pornography-offenses/Full_Report_to_Congress 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AYX-XBLN] (describing the “P2P” software that child-pornography 
offenders use). 
 175. See United States v. Robinson, 714 F.3d 466, 470 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 176. Id. at 468; see Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605–06 (1994) (identifying a 
common-law rule that “some indication of congressional intent . . . is required to dispense with 
mens rea as an element of a crime”). 
 177. E.g., United States v. Ray, 704 F.3d 1307, 1311–12 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 178. United States v. Dodd, 598 F.3d 449, 452 (8th Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted). This 
unique approach, applied strictly only in the Eighth Circuit, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 179. E.g., Robinson, 714 F.3d at 470. 
 180. United States v. Baker, 742 F.3d 618, 621–22 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 181. Ray, 704 F.3d at 1311–12. 
 182. United States v. Creel, 783 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 183. Baker, 742 F.3d at 621; cf. United States v. Ramos, 695 F.3d 1035, 1041 (10th Cir. 
2012) (holding that the distribution enhancements do not require intent to distribute and basing 
that holding on the commentary’s plain text). 
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instance, concluded that “[i]f the Sentencing Commission ‘meant’ to require 
knowledge, it would have ‘said’ as much.”184 Second, the commentary defines 
“[d]istribution to a minor” as “the knowing distribution to an individual who is a minor 
at the time of the offense.”185 The courts viewed this definition as evidence that the 
Commission knew how to draft a knowledge requirement “when they wanted to.”186 
In United States v. Robinson, the Seventh Circuit strenuously disagreed with those 
textualist conclusions.187 Judge Posner’s opinion for the court does not provide any 
textual arguments for the court’s conclusion.188 Instead, the court summarily rejected 
the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning because of the common-law rule against strict liability 
in criminal statutes.189 The court also rejected the argument about the commentary’s 
“distribution to a minor” definition:  
Presumably the required knowledge is that the recipient is a minor, since 
in the absence of “knowing” it might well be assumed that liability is 
strict—that it’s no defense that the minor looked like an adult—which 
was the traditional rule in statutory rape. To assume that by adding 
“knowing” to this definition the Sentencing Commission signaled that 
it’s not required elsewhere is a stretch.190 
Finally, Judge Posner stated that the court was “dealing with a 61-year-old man in 
very poor health . . . who on release will be at low risk of recidivating.”191 
Because of Congress’s particular interest in the child-pornography guidelines,192 
the Commission has been slow to resolve this split. The Commission has issued a 
report to Congress regarding these guidelines, noting the circuit conflict,193 but they 
have not yet proposed an amendment to fix the disparity. 
3. (Proximate) Cause of Death 
Section 2L1.1 of the Guidelines, which deals with smuggling of unlawful aliens, 
includes enhancements that apply “[i]f any person died or sustained bodily injury” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 184. Creel, 783 F.3d at 1360 (quoting U.S. v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014)). 
 185. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2015) (emphasis added). 
 186. Ray, 704 F.3d at 1313. 
 187. 714 F.3d 466, 468–69 (7th Cir. 2013).  
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 468 (“But strict liability is disfavored in the criminal context.”). 
 190. Id. at 468–69 (emphasis added). 
 191. Id. at 468. Robinson was reported to be sixty-two in April 2012, according to a news-
paper report about his original sentence. Retiree Sentenced to Prison in Child Pornography 
Case, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.courierpress.com/news/crime 
/326659661.html [https://perma.cc/NN3K-KHZ4]. The article also reports that he used “file-
sharing programs to download, view and share child pornography.” Id. 
 192. The PROTECT Act of 2003 directly amended section 2G2.2. Prosecutorial Remedies 
and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. 
L. 108-21, § 401(i), 117 Stat. 650, 672–73. 
 193. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 174, at 33 nn.83–84. 
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in the course of the offense.194 The circuits are divided over how directly the defend-
ant must have caused the death or injury.195 The Eighth196 and Ninth197 Circuits have 
held that the offender’s conduct must proximately cause198 the death; the Fifth,199 
Tenth,200 and Eleventh201 Circuits have held that the conduct need only be a but-for 
cause202 of the death, which is an underlying requirement for all enhancements in the 
Sentencing Guidelines.203 Because the enhancement’s text contains no mention of 
causation at all, there can be no textualist justification for reading a heightened cau-
sation requirement into this enhancement.204 
The facts of United States v. Flores-Flores205 present a good example of when 
proximate cause is important. Defendant Flores-Flores was smuggling eleven un-
lawful aliens across the country in a van with only four seats.206 During the journey, 
Flores was tired, so he asked one of the passengers, Anastacio Ramirez-Ortiz, to take 
the wheel.207 Ramirez-Ortiz fell asleep while driving, and the van crashed; two aliens 
were killed in the accident.208 The district court applied the enhancement, which was 
                                                                                                                 
 
 194. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.1(b)(7) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2015). 
 195. United States v. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d 398, 401 & nn.2–3 (5th Cir. 2014) (de-
scribing the circuit split). 
 196. United States v. Flores-Flores, 356 F.3d 861, 862 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 197. United States v. Herrera-Rojas, 243 F.3d 1139, 1144 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 198. A defendant’s action is the proximate cause of a harm if there was no other, more 
direct cause of that harm. See Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics of Causal Intervention, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 827, 828 (2000). 
 199. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d at 401. 
 200. United States v. Cardena-Garcia, 362 F.3d 663, 666 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 201. United States v. Zaldivar, 615 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 202. Justice Scalia recently illustrated “but-for” causation with baseball: 
Consider a baseball game in which the visiting team’s leadoff batter hits a home 
run in the top of the first inning. If the visiting team goes on to win by a score of 
1 to 0, every person competent in the English language and familiar with the 
American pastime would agree that the victory resulted from the home run. This 
is so because it is natural to say that one event is the outcome or consequence of 
another when the former would not have occurred but for the latter. 
Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 888 (2014). 
 203. As a general rule, a sentencing judge should consider “all harm that resulted from” 
the offender’s conduct when applying the Guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1B1.3(a)(3) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (emphasis added). The U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that the phrase “resulted from” means only but-for causation. Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 
887–88. 
 204. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d at 401. 
 205. 356 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 2004).  
 206. Id. at 862. 
 207. Brief for Appellant at 10, Flores-Flores, 356 F.3d 861 (No. 03-3103), 2003 WL 
23005404 at *10. 
 208. Flores-Flores, 356 F.3d at 862. 
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eight levels at the time.209 Flores objected, arguing that he did nothing to proximately 
cause the aliens’ deaths.210 
The Eighth Circuit ultimately decided that Flores did proximately cause the deaths 
because he was transporting far more people in the van than it could hold.211 The 
court noted, however, that “[t]he negligence of Ramirez-Ortiz was not an intervening 
cause relieving Flores of responsibility.”212 This dictum suggests that, in the Eighth 
Circuit, an intervening cause could render the enhancement inapplicable to a defend-
ant because the enhancement requires proximate cause.213 The Ninth Circuit de-
scribed a similar requirement in a footnote: “We assume . . . that for [subsection 
(b)(7)] to apply, the relevant death or injury must be causally connected to dangerous 
conditions created by the unlawful conduct . . . .”214 
As other circuits have noted, the guideline’s language does not expressly require 
any specific type of causation.215 The common law contains a presumption that proxi-
mate cause is an element of any crime that requires a certain result.216 This rule is 
certainly well established for criminal statutes, and the Ninth Circuit has applied it 
to the statutory offense of transporting unlawful aliens resulting in death.217 But 
courts that use the rule are departing from the four corners of the text of the statute 
(or guideline) and applying a common-law rule.218 
The Fifth Circuit recognized the circuit split and agreed with the textualist courts 
that “[t]he guideline contains no causation requirement and [the court has] no license 
to impose one.”219 In United States v. Ramos-Delgado, the court looked instead to 
section 1B1.3, which describes in general the conduct a judge may consider when 
applying the Guidelines.220 Subsection (a)(3) directs a judge to consider “all harm 
that resulted from the acts and omissions” of the offender made during the offense 
conduct.221 The court held that the phrase “resulted from” means but-for, not proxi-
mate, causation.222 
                                                                                                                 
 
 209. Id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.1(b)(6)(4) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2002) (providing the eight-level enhancement in effect in February 2003 when the 
accident occurred). Besides the magnitude of the enhancement, the provision has not substan-
tively changed since 2002. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.1(b)(7)(D) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 210. Flores-Flores, 356 F.3d at 862. 
 211. Id. at 862–63. 
 212. Id. at 863. 
 213. See Moore, supra note 198, at 831. 
 214. United States v. Herrera-Rojas, 243 F.3d 1139, 1144 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis 
added). 
 215. E.g., United States v. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 216. United States v. Pineda-Doval, 614 F.3d 1019, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 217. Id. at 1027–28. 
 218. See supra Part II.A. 
 219. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d at 401 (quoting United States v. Cardena-Garcia, 362 F.3d 
663, 666 (10th Cir. 2004)). 
 220. Id. 
 221. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(3) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 222. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d at 401. The phrase “caused by” might impose a proximate 
cause requirement. See Cardena-Garcia, 362 F.3d at 666 (“Resulting in death and causing 
death are not equivalents.”). 
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No court, applying either method, has actually ruled that a defendant’s relevant 
conduct was the but-for cause, but not the proximate cause, of his victims’ deaths.223 
This might happen if, for example, the “defendants’ actions . . . merely sprained a 
passenger’s hand, making him go to the hospital, and the hospital exploded from a 
gas leak.”224 According to the courts that use a textualist reading, subsection (b)(7) 
would apply to that defendant.225 
The Sentencing Commission has not made revising this guideline a priority in any 
of the three amendment cycles since Ramos-Delgado was decided.226 This is proba-
bly because a scenario that would implicate the split, like the example given above, 
seems so unlikely to occur. 
C. The Problem with Appellate Sentencing Discretion 
As the foregoing examples illustrate, the courts of appeals do not always follow 
the text of the Guidelines, even when the text is unambiguous. While this is con-
sistent with the way some courts interpret statutes,227 the differences between the 
Commission and Congress make this sort of interpretation harder to justify.228 
Congress has empowered the Sentencing Commission to write the Guidelines and 
determine federal sentencing policy.229 District courts may disagree with and dis-
regard this policy, but they must do so transparently by stating a reason for vari-
ance.230 Courts of appeals, however, have no such direct authority. Differences 
among the circuits lead to disparities simply because a guideline might apply to cer-
tain conduct in one jurisdiction and not the other. 
Take as an example an offender who unknowingly distributes child pornography 
through a P2P file-sharing program. If he were convicted in Kansas, located in the 
Tenth Circuit, the court would apply the two-level enhancement in section 
2G2.2(b)(3)(F).231 On the other hand, if he were convicted in Illinois, part of the 
Seventh Circuit, he would not receive the enhancement, leading to a significantly 
shorter sentence.232 This geographic or jurisdictional disparity is clearly unwarranted. 
If this power of the appellate courts is left unchecked, the Commission’s ability 
to use the words of the Guidelines233 to set federal sentencing policy will be subject 
                                                                                                                 
 
 223. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Flores, 356 F.3d 861, 863 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that defendant’s actions did proximately cause deaths). 
 224. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d at 402. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See Final Priorities for Amendment Cycle, 81 Fed. Reg. 58,004 (Aug. 24, 2016); Final 
Priorities for Amendment Cycle, 80 Fed. Reg. 48,957 (Aug. 14, 2015); Final Priorities for 
Amendment Cycle, 79 Fed. Reg. 49,378 (Aug. 20, 2014). 
 227. See supra Part II.A. 
 228. See infra Part III. 
 229. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2012). 
 230. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108–09 (2007). 
 231. See United States v. Ray, 704 F.3d 1307, 1313 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 232. See United States v. Robinson, 714 F.3d 466, 468–69 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 233. Cf. Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1613 (2012) (“Whether or not Congress is al-
ways meticulous, if we don’t assume that Congress picks its words with care, then Congress 
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to the common-law power of the courts of appeals. It is therefore important to discuss 
the proper use of the appellate power to interpret the Guidelines and to consider how 
to minimize these types of disparities. 
III. THE GUIDELINES ARE NOT STATUTES 
Judges often invoke Congress’s complex lawmaking procedure as a reason to de-
part from the plain meaning of the text of a statute.234 Indeed, Congress is a compli-
cated body, and interpreting its words can be a challenging endeavor. But the 
Sentencing Commission is not, as Justice Scalia famously described, merely a 
“junior-varsity Congress.”235 The Commission’s membership and its procedures 
practically ensure that the body means what it says in the Guidelines.236 This Part 
will show the differences between the Commission and Congress and propose that 
the Guidelines should not be interpreted with all the freedom of statutory 
interpretation. 
Congress designed the Sentencing Commission as a politically insulated, inde-
pendent body of experts who would set sentencing policy without being influenced 
by public pressure.237 The Commission currently comprises five voting members and 
two ex officio members who do not vote.238 The voting Commissioners include three 
federal judges, a law professor, and a former Assistant U.S. Attorney,239 and nearly 
everyone who has ever served on the Commission has been either a judge or a law 
professor.240 These individuals are selected for their expertise in sentencing issues 
and their practical experience with sentencing.241 The Commissioners also have to 
be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and no more than four 
                                                                                                                 
 
won’t be able to rely on words to specify what policies it wishes to adopt . . . .” (emphasis in 
original)). 
 234. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015) (“Congress passed much of 
the Act using a complicated budgetary procedure known as ‘reconciliation,’ with limited op-
portunities for debate and amendment . . . .”). 
 235. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring 
to the Commission’s lawmaking powers). 
 236. Justice Thomas lucidly described statutory textualism as the doctrine that “courts must 
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there.” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). 
 237. Gertner, supra note 15, at 698. 
 238. About the Commissioners, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov/about 
/commissioners/about-commissioners [https://perma.cc/A2LX-NYYZ]; see also Organiza-
tion,  U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov/about/who-we-are/organization [https:// 
perma.cc/E5FW-Z82V] (noting that two of the seven voting positions on the Commission are 
vacant as of November 2016). 
 239. About the Commissioners, supra note 238. 
 240. Former Commissioner Information, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov 
/new/former-commissioner-information [https://perma.cc/978Q-3KT7]. Current Supreme 
Court Associate Justice Stephen Breyer was a founding member of the Sentencing 
Commission. Id. 
 241. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2012) mandates that “at least 3 of the members shall 
be Federal judges.” 
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can be from a single party.242 Finally, Commissioners can be removed “by the 
President only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause 
shown.”243 
Members of Congress, by contrast, are politicians with political motivations. A 
recent survey of Congress showed that 331 out of 535 members consider themselves 
professional politicians, nearly sixty-two percent.244 As a result, political pressures 
affect legislative decisions much more than members’ expertise does. Senator Orrin 
Hatch once stated that he had long personally supported reducing sentences for drug 
crimes but that he was not able to act on that for political reasons.245 Furthermore, 
while the Commissioners are experts on criminal law and sentencing, Congress’s 
expertise is much more varied.246 In the 114th Congress, at most sixty-four members 
have judicial or law enforcement experience.247 This variety can promote a demo-
cratic and representational legislature, but it suggests that members of Congress may 
not necessarily understand everything they vote for. Thus, legislative mistakes are 
inevitable.248 
Even if the Commission does make a textual mistake, as it might have done with 
the death-threat enhancement discussed earlier,249 it can easily correct the mistake. 
Congress has directed the Commission to “periodically . . . review and revise” the 
Guidelines250 and to submit proposed amendments to Congress by May 1 each 
year.251 As a result, the Commission usually drafts amendments in yearly batches, 
publishing a new edition of the Guidelines Manual each November.252 
                                                                                                                 
 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43869, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 114TH 
CONGRESS: A PROFILE 2 (2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43869.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/9WHZ-7SEC]. The profile notes that “[m]ost Members list more than one profession.” Id. 
at 3 n.8. 
 245. Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 43 
(2006). 
 246. See MANNING, supra note 244, at 3–4. 
 247. This number includes members who describe themselves as judges, prosecutors, sher-
iffs, or police officers, but it does not account for possible double counting of members who 
reported more than one of these occupations. Id.  
 248. Cf. Gluck, supra note 8, at 101. 
 249. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 250. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2012). 
 251. Id. § 994(p). 
 252. The Commission has released a new version of the Guidelines nearly every November 
since 1989. Guidelines Manual Archives, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov 
/guidelines-manual/guidelines-manual-archives [https://perma.cc/38L9-AX4E]. There have 
been only two exceptions. In 1999, the chair of the Commission resigned and the other 
commissioners’ terms expired, leaving no voting commissioner to vote on amendments until 
November, long after the May 1 deadline. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 
7 (1999), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports 
-and-sourcebooks/1999/ar99chap2.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6DT-ZRZX]. In 1996, the Com-
mission “declared a moratorium on guideline amendments” to focus on a comprehensive 
simplification of the Guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1999), 
840 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:817 
 
The Sentencing Commission goes through an amendment cycle each year.253 In 
August, the Commission publishes its policy “priorities” for the year’s batch of 
amendments.254 These priorities are set based on the Commission’s continual re-
search of sentencing practices nationwide.255 For example, the Commission’s priori-
ties for the 2013 cycle included “[r]eview, and possible amendment, of guidelines 
applicable to drug offenses, including possible consideration of amending the Drug 
Quantity Table . . . across drug types.”256 The amendment that this review produced 
ultimately released six thousand federal inmates in 2015.257 
Next, the Commission solicits the advice of various interested parties in the crimi-
nal justice system.258 The U.S. Probation System, the Bureau of Prisons, the Judicial 
Conference, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, and the Federal 
Public Defenders are all required by statute to comment on the Commission’s pro-
posals.259 By January, the draft amendment language is ready, which the Commission 
publishes for public comment.260  
Finally, at the end of April, the Commissioners vote to send the proposed amend-
ments to Congress.261 If Congress is silent, the amendments take effect on November 
1 of that year.262 To disapprove a proposed amendment, Congress must pass a law 
through both houses, and the President must sign it.263 Congress has passed such a 
bill only once in the history of the Guidelines.264 
Congress’s procedure, memorialized in Schoolhouse Rock,265 is incredibly in-
volved266 and often results in gridlock.267 Even the constitutional requirements for 




 253. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 25 (2015), http:// 
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys 
/miscellaneous/201510_fed-sentencing-basics.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF6W-9QHK]. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See id. at 27. 
 256. Notice of Final Priorities, 78 Fed. Reg. 51,820, 51,821 (Aug. 21, 2013). 
 257. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 258. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 253, at 25; see 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2012) 
(“[T]he Commission shall consult with authorities on . . . various aspects of the Federal crimi-
nal justice system.”). 
 259. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o). 
 260. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 253, at 25. 
 261. Id. 
 262. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 253, at 25. 
 263. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 253, at 25. 
 264. Id. at 25, 38 n.183. On October 30, 1995, Congress and President Clinton disapproved 
two proposed amendments: one that would reduce the controversial 100-to-1 crack to powder 
cocaine weight ratio and another regarding sentences for money laundering. Act of Oct. 30, 
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334; Statement on Signing Legislation Rejecting U.S. 
Sentencing Commission Recommendations, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1700 (Oct. 30, 1995). 
 265. Schoolhouse Rock: I’m Just a Bill (ABC television broadcast Feb. 5, 1977), 
http://abc.go.com/shows/schoolhouse-rock/episode-guide/season-01/24-im-just-a-bill [https:// 
perma.cc/LTD9-TA9R]. 
 266. See U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 267. See Gluck, supra note 8, at 107–08. 
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passing a bill are stringent: a bill must pass both houses of Congress and be signed 
by the President.268 Furthermore, a complex system of committees and sub-
committees can prevent a bill from ever reaching a floor vote,269 and congressional 
leadership can exert a surprising amount of influence on voting outcomes through 
such seemingly benign powers as the right to set the day’s agenda.270 
 The Commission’s fluent procedure means that it can correct its mistakes. When 
the circuit split developed over the “express threat” enhancement described above, 
the Commission amended that guideline to delete the word “express.”271 Though that 
amendment took four years from the time the disagreement started,272 that is rela-
tively fast considering the amount of research the Commission does. Therefore, the 
Commission does not need the courts to fix perceived errors in the text of the 
Guidelines, even if Congress does.273 
IV. STRICT TEXTUALISM 
A strictly textualist interpretation of an unambiguous provision—or of the un-
ambiguous commentary to an unclear provision274—is the best way to interpret the 
Guidelines. There are several reasons for this argument. First, strict textualism, un-
adorned by common-law presumptions or policy-based canons, is the method of in-
terpretation least susceptible to judicial manipulation. Second, strict interpretation 
will encourage the Sentencing Commission to be meticulous when drafting the 
Guidelines in the first place275 and will signal to the Commission when they have 
drafted a guideline incorrectly without creating the potential for unwarranted dispar-
ities caused by a circuit split. 
Courts must therefore be careful not to read into the Guidelines background prin-
ciples from the common law or policy considerations.276 While many of these 
considerations make sense for actual statutes, to which they applied at common law, 
they should not apply to the Guidelines, which are a novel kind of text that only 
emerged in the last thirty years. Furthermore, judicial use of policy considerations 
undermines the Sentencing Commission’s role in setting sentencing policy for the 
United States.277 To be sure, some of that discretion was transferred to district courts 
                                                                                                                 
 
 268. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 269. See POPKIN, supra note 133, at 500–01. 
 270. Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. 
L. REV. 561, 564–65 (1977). 
 271. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 272. United States v. Canzater, the Eleventh Circuit case that used a textualist reading, was 
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 276. See supra Part II.A. 
 277. See 28 U.S.C. 994(a) (2012). 
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by the Booker decision, but none besides the ability to vacate an “unreasonable” 
sentence was ever assigned to courts of appeals;278 those courts can only affect 
sentences by interpreting the Guidelines. 
The two sections below suggest two ways279 to solve this unwarranted disparity. 
The first would be imposed on courts by the Commission; the second, the courts must 
adopt themselves. 
A. An Interpretive Guideline 
The Sentencing Commission can directly articulate a preferred method of inter-
pretation within the Guidelines Manual itself. There is already plenty of information 
in the Guidelines about their application; for example, the commentary to section 
1B1.1 contains a list of general definitions that control the entire Manual.280 The 
Commission could insert the following language into that section:  
The guidelines shall be interpreted according to their plain language 
when it is unambiguous and according to the plain language of the com-
mentary when the corresponding guideline is ambiguous. No guideline 
shall be interpreted to have any implied meaning, and substantive canons 
of statutory interpretation do not apply to unambiguous guidelines. 
This would be a difficult directive to ignore, both for parties and for judges, and 
it would discourage judges from applying substantive considerations that they admit 
are not clearly part of the text.281 
But courts have long resisted legislative attempts to control statutory interpreta-
tion;282 there is no reason to believe that courts will treat similar attempts by the 
Sentencing Commission differently. Professor Gluck describes a Connecticut statute 
that prohibited judges from considering “extratextual evidence” when the text is un-
ambiguous and notes that the Connecticut Supreme Court has strongly resisted the 
effect of the statute.283 Indeed, that court has found ambiguity in a statute simply 
because the litigants disputed the statute’s meaning.284 
                                                                                                                 
 
 278. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005) (Breyer, J., majority opinion). 
 279. This Note deals with only those guidelines that have facially unambiguous texts. The 
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 283. Id. at 1794–95 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-2z (West 2007)). 
 284. Id. at 1795–96, 1796 n.169 (listing cases); see, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 954 A.2d 806, 
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Moreover, the Braxton decision means that the Supreme Court would probably 
deny certiorari to any case dealing with the interpretation of the Guidelines.285 With-
out a meaningful right to appeal, prosecutors and defendants would have no way to 
correct a circuit court’s decision to disregard the interpretive rule. As a result, such a 
rule would have no teeth. 
B. Changing the Courts 
Because any external rule for interpreting the Guidelines would be too-easily re-
sisted by courts, this change must come from within the bench itself. Courts of ap-
peals must recognize that any time two circuits interpret a guideline differently, they 
create “unwarranted sentencing disparities,”286 and they cannot each simply blame 
the disparity on the other court’s erroneous interpretation. Instead, circuit court 
judges should aspire to use a single method of interpretation—preferably, strict 
textualism. 
Some judges may shudder at the notion of any stricture in statutory interpretation, 
as it is the court’s responsibility to “say what the law is.”287 Or, because many of the 
common-law rules that apply to criminal statutes tend to benefit defendants, judges 
may face the morally uncomfortable task of affirming a sentence they find too 
harsh.288 Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in the Robinson case, was 
reluctant to sentence a “61-year-old man in very poor health” to ten years in prison.289 
Appellate courts may also be unwilling to give up what little discretion they have in 
the sentencing process.290 
Consistent textual interpretation among the circuits would return sentencing dis-
cretion and the authority to decide sentencing policy to the parties that should right-
fully possess it: the Sentencing Commission and district courts. It would affect the 
way prosecutors, who rely on the meaning of the Guidelines, make plea agreements, 
and whether defendants choose to appeal their sentences. Finally, and most im-
portantly, it would eliminate the possibility of the unwarranted sentencing disparities 
described in Part II.B. 
If the Sentencing Commission realizes that the text of a guideline does not ade-
quately convey its purpose, it can easily amend the provision to make it clearer. This 
is what the Commission did for the “express threat of death” guideline—here, the 
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solution would be the same, but there would not be a circuit split to create the dis-
parities seen in that example.291 
CONCLUSION 
As the history of sentencing reform has shown, substantive sentencing decisions 
are properly made only by the Sentencing Commission and trial courts. The 
Commission derives its authority from the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, with 
which Congress significantly reduced judicial discretion at sentencing. When the 
Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory in Booker, trial judges reclaimed 
much of their former discretion, but the Commission still had a say in sentencing 
policy, however weak.  
The federal courts of appeals were never empowered to make sentencing policy. 
But the federal appellate bench has enough discretion to influence policy simply by 
interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines. When different courts interpret a provision 
of the Guidelines differently, sentencing disparities can result among the circuits, and 
this threatens the principle of uniform sentencing that underlies the modern 
sentencing-reform movement. Disparities caused by interpretation are especially un-
warranted when they contradict the unambiguous language that the Commission uses 
in the Guidelines. 
Uniformity of sentencing can be preserved most effectively with uniformity of 
interpretation among the federal courts of appeals. While there are many ways to 
interpret statutes, courts can eliminate disparities by deciding on a single method 
when they consider the Guidelines. Justifications for deviating from the un-
ambiguous text of a statute, such as procedural efficiency or common-law principles, 
do not apply to the Guidelines because of the Sentencing Commission’s unique com-
position and procedure. 
Thus, the method most conducive to uniformity, and the only method that can 
preserve the Commission’s role in setting the nation’s sentencing policy, is strict 
textualism. This approach is easy to justify because it defers substantially to the 
Commission’s ability to express its policy decisions in words and to fix its own mis-
takes, as it has done by recently reducing the Guidelines’ sentences for drug offenses. 
If a textualist reading of the Guidelines is adopted throughout the federal circuits, the 
Commission can continue to effectively produce advisory sentencing policy for the 
trial courts, and courts of appeals can save their interpretive power for the truly dif-
ficult sentencing cases. 
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